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Private Enforcement of Antitrust Rules-
Modernization of the EU Rules and the
Road Ahead
By Donncadh Woods*
I. Introduction
The author would like to express his appreciation to the
Institute for Consumer Antitrust Studies, Loyola University Chicago,
for inviting him to its February 2004 conference on the Future of
Private Rights of Action in Antitrust, a subject that is now attracting
increasing attention in Europe.
This article, an expanded version of the author's presentation
at the aforementioned Loyola conference, includes: (1) an
introduction which sets out the background to the debate on private
enforcement in Europe; (2) key features of private enforcement in the
United States, which may be relevant from an European Union
("EU") perspective; (3) key features of private enforcement in the
EU; (4) the work of the European Commission ("Commission") in
the area of private enforcement; and (5) a conclusion. This article is
up-to-date to 20 February 2004, and presents an overview of the
issues raised. It does not pretend to be en exhaustive compendium of
all the law, case law and otherwise, on the subject.
A. Antitrust Modernization
On 16 December 2002, the Council of Ministers adopted a
new regulation (the "Regulation"),1 which laid down the foundation
* Mr. Woods is the Deputy Head of the Policy Development Unit of the
Directorate General for Competition, Commission of the European Communities.
The views expressed in this speech are entirely those of the author and may not in any
circumstances be regarded as stating an official position of the European
Commission. The author would like to thank Ailsa Sinclair and David Ashton for
their contributions to this paper.
Council Regulation 1/2003 of 16 December 2002 on the implementation of
the rules on competition laid down in Articles 81 and 82 of the EC Treaty, 2003
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for a new and more efficient enforcement of Articles 81 and 82 of the
European Community ("EC") Treaty,2 which seek to regulate cartels
and abuses of dominant position respectively. Known as antitrust
modernization, the central element of the new Regulation is that it
eliminates the present notification and exemption system, whereby
the Commission has the exclusive right to decide whether agreements
notified to it can benefit from individual exemption under Article
81(3), and introduces the direct application of Article 81 as a whole.3
This new system will be applied from May 1, 2004.4
The new system will enhance the effective enforcement of the
competition rules of the EC in several ways:
(1) It will reduce bureaucracy for companies who no longer
have to notify agreements to the Commission.
(2) It will allow the Commission to focus its enforcement
activities on the most serious infringements like cartels and
abusive behavior by dominant firms, instead of working
down a pile of notifications.
(3) It will allow the national competition authorities to
participate fully in the application of EC competition law,
not only Article 82 but also now Article 81 in its entirety.
The national competition authorities together with the
Commission form a network of public authorities applying
the EC competition rules. This network is called the
European Competition Network ("ECN").
(4) The new system will ensure that EC competition law is
the single common standard for the assessment of
restrictive agreements by all authorities in the ECN and
O.J. (LI) (4 January 2003).
2 CONSOLIDATED VERSION OF THE TREATY ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN
COMMUNITY, Dec. 24, 2002, O.J. (C 325) (4 December 2002) [hereinafter "EC
TREATY"].
3 The Commission's monopoly in applying Article 81(3) is provided for in
Commission Regulation No 17: First Regulation of 21 February 1962
implementing Articles 85 and 86 of the Treaty, art. 4, 1962 O.J. SPEc. ED. (P 013).
The direct applicability of Article 81(3) of the Treaty is now provided for in Article
1(2) of Regulation 1/2003.
4 Council Regulation 1/2003, art. 45, 2003 O.J. (L1).
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thereby establishes a level playing field for companies
active in the internal market of the EU.
(5) The new system will allow national courts to fully
adjudicate a competition matter. This is important because,
up until now, courts were often blocked in their action
because of the notification of agreements to the
Commission.
When drafting its proposal for the Regulation, the
Commission was aware that its monopoly on Article 81(3)
represented a major obstacle to more extensive application of the
competition rules by national courts.5 As noted above, an undertaking
could bring private actions to a halt simply by lodging a notification
with the Commission. Since the Commission considers private
enforcement of EC competition rules an important complement to
public enforcement of those rules by national competition authorities,
a number of measures were introduced in the Commission proposal
to stimulate private enforcement.
First, Regulation 1/2003 eliminates the exemption monopoly
of the Commission. As a result, national judges will be able to rule on
whether Article 81(3) is applicable. That power is confirmed in
Article 6 of the Regulation. In the Commission's view, the
elimination of the exemption monopoly and the related abolition of
the notification system will stimulate complainants to have more
frequent recourse to national courts in actions for damages. 6 It is
anticipated that private enforcement will thus increase as a result of
the Regulation.
Second, and perhaps more important, Article 3 of the
Regulation imposes on national judges the obligation to apply
Articles 81 and 82 of the EC Treaty when they apply national
competition law to agreements, decisions, concerted practices, or
abuses within the meaning of Articles 81 or 82 of the EC Treaty. The
Regulation requires that the outcome of the analysis under national
7law and under Article 81 must be the same.
5 White Paper on Modernisation of the Rules Implementing Articles 85 and 86
of the EC Treaty-Commission Programme No. 99/027, COM(99) 101, at 100 (28
April 1999), available at http://aei.pitt.edu/archive/00001175/ (last visited Apr. 29,
2004).
6 Cf. Council Regulation 1/2003, Recital 7, 2003 O.J. (L1).
7 Council Regulation 1/2003, art. 3(2), 2003 O.J. (Li). There is no
convergence requirement for unilateral conduct under Article 82, where Member
2004]
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The possibility to apply EC competition rules has now been
turned into an obligation to apply EC competition rules. That means
that national enforcers will join the Commission in the enforcement
of Articles 81 and 82 of the EC Treaty.
B. The EC Law Context for Private Enforcement of Community
Competition Law
The issue of private enforcement of Community competition
law is one of protecting Community law rights through adequate
remedies and proceedings in the courts of the Member States. The
division between rights on the one hand, commonly an area of
Community legal competence, and remedies and procedural
conditions, on the other hand, which are mostly left to national law, is
fundamental to the structure of Community law. Given this
distinction, the European Court of Justice ("ECJ") has stipulated that
remedies and procedures for breach of Community law must be
provided by the courts of the Member States. Specifically, the
Community court has held that national law must protect Community
law rights to a basic level of minimum effectiveness and ensure that
national law rights are not protected more favorably than the
equivalent Community law rights.8
EC law has recently taken a significant step forward in terms of
the remedies available to litigating parties in the enforcement of private
law rights, and this significant private law development has taken place
in the field of competition law. In Courage v. Crehan, the ECJ held
that national courts must provide a remedy in damages for the
enforcement of the rights and obligations created by Article 81 of the
EC Treaty.9 It is worth repeating the relevant passage of the judgment
States may adopt stricter national competition laws for unilateral conduct.
8 See, e.g., Case 33/76, Rewe-Zentralfinanz and Rewe-Zentral v.
Landwirtschaftskammer fijr das SaarlandSteenhorst-Neerings, 1993 E.C.R. 1-5475;
and Case 66/95, The Queen v. Secretary of State for Social Security ex parte
Eunice Sutton, 1997 E.C.R. 1-2163.
9 Case C-453/99, Courage Ltd. v. Bernard Crehan and Bernard Crehan v.
Courage Ltd. and Others, 2001 E.C.R. 1 (Eng. C.A. 1999), available at 1999 WL
394609. The Opinion of AG Van Gerven in Case C-128/92, Banks v. British Coal,
1994 E.C.R. 1-1209, also dealt extensively with the issue of the availability of
damages before national courts for breach of Community competition law. See
Crehan, at 36-54. The court's judgment in the case, however, did not deal with
this issue since it held that the case related only to Articles 65 and 66 of the
European Coal and Steel Community Treaty ("ECSC Treaty") and that the
Commission, and not national courts, was competent to determine an infringement
of those articles.
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in full:
The full effectiveness of Article [81] of the Treaty and, in
particular, the practical effect of the prohibition laid down
in Article [81(1)] would be put at risk if it were not open to
any individual to claim damages for loss caused to him by a
contract or by conduct liable to restrict or distort
competition.
Indeed, the existence of such a right strengthens the
working of the Community competition rules and
discourages agreements or practices, which are frequently
covert, which are liable to restrict or distort competition.
From that point of view, actions for damages before the
national courts can make a significant contribution to the
maintenance of effective competition in the Community.' 0
This ruling, taken in conjunction with the fact that antitrust
modernization has removed the Commission's monopoly over the
application of Article 81(3) of the EC Treaty, paves the way for
Community-level review of the rules relating to remedies and
procedures for private actions for breach of Community competition
law.
II. Key Features of Private Enforcement in the United
States That may be Relevant from an EU
Perspective
It is clear that, while private enforcement of the competition
rules is well developed in the United States, it is still relatively
underdeveloped in the EU.' In search of an explanation for this
'0 See Crehan, at M 26 & 27.
11 It is commonly stated that private actions account for 90% of antitrust
enforcement in the United States. Clifford A. Jones, A New Dawn for Private
Competition Law Remedies in Europe? Reflections from the US, Report to the 2001
EUI Conference on Private Enforcement of EC Antitrust Law, in EUROPEAN
COMPETITION LAW ANNUAL 2001: EFFECTIVE PRIVATE ENFORCEMENT OF EC
ANTITRUST LAW 95, 99 (Ehlerman and Atanasiu eds., Hart 2003). There is an
average ratio of approximately 9 to 1 private to public antirust proceedings over the
period 1996 to 2000. Id. Figures for the EU are harder to come by, but an older
article provides figures which indicate an average ratio of approximately 1 to 21
private to public enforcement for 11 Member States of the then EEC (only figures
for Ireland are missing) over the period 1989 to 1992, which is a percentage of
2004]
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divergence, we are faced not only with different cultural attitudes vis-
A-vis the use of claims for damages to tackle injurious behavior, but a
different procedural and legal framework.
Exploring from an EU perspective the legal context in which
private enforcement takes place within the United States, one is
readily struck by the presence of a number of incentives that are
generally unknown in Europe, namely, class actions, contingency
fees, treble damages, and certain provisions relating to costs and
discovery.
A. Class Actions
As a result of the possibility to bring class actions, private
actors who do not want to litigate on their own, for example, because
the damage caused is too small compared to the costs of prosecution,
will nevertheless be inclined to join a class action and thus, profit
from the economies of scale. Class actions brought under antitrust
law appear to serve a dual purpose: (1) they provide compensation
for a large number of antitrust victims who have such small
individual claims that they would go uncompensated otherwise; and
(2) they may provide a powerful deterrent effect that can offer
widespread, albeit invisible, benefits to all consumers. At the same
time, it is understood that the class action is controversial, especially
when the plaintiff's lawyers receive high fees, while the class action
members are awarded coupons of limited value. In addition, it seems
that class actions may be abused to negotiate large settlements in
cases of dubious merit. Another problem may be potential conflicts
of interest among multiple parties.
B. Contingency Fees
Even the possibility of bringing class actions may not be a
sufficient incentive for a private actor to initiate suit because it still
requires money, time, and energy to formulate a collective lawsuit. In
the system of contingency fees, these litigation costs are transferred
to the law firms willing to assume these costs because of the prospect
of a share in a potentially large damages award. These fees are often
disputed, as Section 4 of the Clayton Act provides for an award of
'reasonable' attorney fees.' 2 Contingency fees are not permitted in
roughly 95% public enforcement. See Jacques H.J. Bourgeois, EC Competition
Law and Member State Courts, 17 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 331, 332-33 (1994).
12 Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 15a (2004).
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litigation in the majority of EU countries. It is understood that
attorneys acting on behalf of plaintiffs in the United States often try
to settle cases in order to minimize their litigation risk.
C. Treble Damages
The published cases in Europe suggest that damages awarded by
national courts are modest in value. This is not the case in the
United States, where the plaintiff may recover damages that are treble
the value of his actual loss. Treble damages were designed, in part, to
punish past violations of the antitrust laws and also to deter future
antitrust violations.' 4 It is often argued, however, that effective lack
of prejudgment interest15 in the United States means that
compensation awarded is, on this view, closer to single damages.' 6 It
is understood that prejudgment interest is limited to situations in
which a litigant has acted in bad faith to delay proceedings. 17
D. Costs
Another significant factor behind the high level of private
enforcement in the United States is that the costs of the defendant do
not have to be reimbursed by the plaintiff even if the plaintiff loses
his case. In most EU jurisdictions, the costs of the successful party
are paid, at least in part, by the losing party.'
8
13 See infra Part III.
14 Am. Soc'y of Mech. Eng'rs v. Hydrolevel Corp., 456 U.S. 556 (1982).
15 Prejudgment interest is commonly understood to be interest awarded by the
court on damages for the period from the time of injury to the date of judgment.
16 Robert H. Lande, Are Antitrust "Treble" Damages Really Single Damages,
54 OHIO STATE L.J. 115, 122 (1993); and S.D. Susman, Mandatory Treble
Damages-Time for a New Look?, COMM'N ON CORPORATE AND ANTITRUST LAW
OF THE SECTION OF CORPORATION, BANKING, AND BUSINESS LAW, American Bar
Association Annual Meeting (New Orleans, 1981) reprinted as an attachment in
Antitrust Damage Allocation: Hearings before the Subcomm. on Monopolies and
Commercial Law of the House Comm on the Judiciary, 97th Cong., 1st and 2d
Sess., 170-177 (1981-82) (statement of J. Sims).
17 Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 15a (2004).
18 This is the case, for example, under English and German civil procedural
2004] 437
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E. Discovery
Finally, we should not forget that a party seeking damages for
violation of competition rules in the United States disposes of a wide
range of possibilities to get access to the evidence needed to prove his
case. These far-reaching powers of discovery are reinforced by a
maximum jail sentence of five years for contempt of court, resulting
from the non-production or destruction of documents. 
1 9
The procedural context in the EU is different from that in the
United States. First, the ECJ lacks jurisdiction to deal with private
claims for damages because the relevant forum is that of the national
courts. That means that, to the extent there are no procedural rules at
the European level-and as a matter of EC law procedural rules are
limited in scope for the moment-the national courts operate in the
context of their national procedural rules.
III. Key Features of Private Enforcement in the EU
In Courage v. Crehan, the court gives some potential
guidance as to the remedial and procedural conditions for private
actions for breach of Community competition law.21 However, there
are a number of outstanding questions that remain unanswered. This
section of the paper addresses some of these issues.
A. Jurisdiction
The principal issue in Empagran S.A. v. F. Hoffman-LaRoche
Ltd.,22 which is currently before U.S. courts, is whether U.S. courts
can exercise jurisdiction over antitrust cases when the following four
conditions are met: (1) the plaintiff is foreign; (2) the transactions in
question take place outside the United States; (3) the anticompetitive
behavior in question has a "direct, substantial, and reasonably
foreseeable effect" 23 on the U.S. market; and (4) the damage suffered
by the plaintiff is not caused by the effects felt on the U.S. market but
19 FED. R. Crv. P. 37.
20 See supra note 9.
21 See Crehan, n[ 20, 23, & 31-34.
22 Empagran S.A., et al. v. F. Hoffman-LaRoche Ltd., et al., 315 F.3d 338
(D.C. Cir. 2003), cert. granted, 124 S. Ct. 966 (Dec. 15, 2003) (No. 03-724).
23 The wording from Section 6a(1) of the Foreign Antitrust Improvements Act
of 1982, the governing statutory provision. 15 U.S.C. § 6a(1) (2004).
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by effects felt on a market outside the U.S. In a nutshell, the issue is
whether a nexus between the conduct and where its effects are felt is
required to give jurisdiction.
The issues recently argued before, and decided by, the
English High Court at the interlocutory stage in Provimi Ltd. v.
24Trouw (UK) Ltd., are different, though the two cases both derive
from anticompetitive behavior in the vitamins market. Again, in
Provimi some of the claimants and some of the defendants were
foreign. Again, some of the transactions under consideration took
place outside the territorial jurisdiction of the court. Again, the effects
of the cartel were felt throughout Europe, including England as well
as France, Germany, and Switzerland (the three other jurisdictions in
which the parties were based). Finally, the English court, like the
United States Court of Appeals for the District of Colombia Circuit,
granted jurisdiction for claims relating to injury suffered outside its
territory.
However, there is less scope for debate over the conclusion
reached by the court in Provimi on jurisdiction because questions of
jurisdiction between the states in which the parties were domiciled
were determined by the court in accordance with interstate
agreements (the Lugano Convention) in the case of Switzerland,25
and EU law in the case of the other states (the Brussels Convention,
now Regulation 44/200126). The court established the jurisdiction of
the English courts in relation to the claims involving parties
domiciled in England on the basis of Articles 2(1) and 5(3) of
Regulation 44/2001 and the corresponding articles of the Lugano
Convention. According to Article 2(1), the defendant is to be sued in
the court of the state in which he is domiciled (covering the English
defendants in the proceedings), and according to Article 5(3) the
defendant can, in tort cases, be sued in the courts "of the place where
the harmful event occurred." The court was prepared to assume that
the place where the harmful event occurred is England for a claimant
24 Provimi Ltd. v. Trouw (UK) Ltd. et al., 2003 E.W.H.C. 961 (Comm. May 6,
2003).
25 EC EFTA Lugano Convention on Jurisdiction and the Enforcement of
Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters (16 Sept. 1988), available at
http://www.jus.uio.no/Im/ec.efta.jurisdiction.enforcement.judgments.civil.commerc
ial.matters.lugano.convention. 1998/portrait (last visited Apr. 29, 2004).
26 Council Regulation (EC) 44/2001 of 22 December 2001 on jurisdiction and
the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters,
2001 O.J. (L 12) 1.
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27domiciled in England. Second, the court then held that the claims in
the proceedings not involving an English claimant or defendant can
be heard in addition by the English courts on the grounds that those
claims were sufficiently connected to those claims falling under the
jurisdiction of the English courts by virtue of the fact that the
defendant is domiciled in England. This is provided for in Article
6(1) of Regulation 44/2001.28 The upshot therefore is that the English
court held that it had jurisdiction to hear claims brought by non-
English claimants against non-English defendants, in addition to the
claims involving English parties.
It is not the case in Empagran that the district court's
findings as to jurisdiction were made in accordance with legal
instruments agreed between the states of domicile of the parties to
proceedings. Although the decision in Provimi appears to give the
English courts wide jurisdiction, the jurisdictional conditions for
hearing private antitrust actions should be the same throughout the
courts of the EU Member States if those courts apply Regulation
44/2001 consistently. The question as to which courts plaintiffs will
go will be determined by other procedural, as well as possibly
substantive, factors, such as standing and causation of damage, or the
definition of infringement.
B. Standing
The court in Provimi made interesting interlocutory findings
(to the standard of a "reasonably arguable claim" and not on the
merits) as to the definition of the entity that committed the
infringement, and as to causation of damage. On the first point, the
court held that knowledge on the part of the subsidiary of the cartel,
as organized by the parent company, was not necessary to impute the
infringement in question to an undertaking defined widely enough to
include both parent and such subsidiary. As to causation, the court
held that selling on the market in one Member State A at a fixed price
could be held to have caused loss to a purchaser in another Member
State B, even though that purchaser did not purchase from the
offending undertaking operating in Member State A. The court
reasoned that in conditions of competition, the seller in Member State
A could be expected to provide the product at a lower price to the
27 Provimi, 2003 E.W.H.C. 961, 10.
28 Article 6(1) of Regulation 44/2001 provides that this is the case where "the
claims are so closely connected that it is expedient to hear them together to avoid
the risk of irreconcilable judgments resulting from separate proceedings."
440 [Vol. 16:4
Modernization of the EU Rules
benefit (either direct or in terms of the downward pressure this would
have put on prices charged by other sellers, including those based in
Member State B) of the purchaser based in Member State B.
Assumptions of interstate commerce and the functioning of the
internal market underlie this judgment, just as the reality of the global
effect of cartels on global trade underlie the reasoning of the D.C.
Circuit in Empagran. Putting these two findings together, the
conclusion is that, under English law, or at least under Community
law as applied by the English courts, a purchaser based in one
Member State has standing to bring a damages action against the
subsidiary of a cartel member based in another Member State even
where, (1) that subsidiary did not have any knowledge of the cartel as
operated by the parent but merely implemented it by charging the
cartel price, and (2) there was no actual purchase by this purchaser
from this subsidiary.
By contrast, a recent judgment of the Berliner Landgericht
(German district court), Max Boegl Bauunternehmung et al v.
Hanson Germany,29 is restrictive as to standing. 30 The court held that
purchasers of cement at cartel prices could not claim damages unless
they had been individually targeted by a market-sharing cartel. 31 It is
not enough that prices in the market in which the purchasers were
buying were affected as a whole by the cartel. Indeed, the court held
that the fact that the whole market was affected equally meant that
there was no specific disadvantage to the individual claimants, and,
hence, the action could not be founded.32 This is clearly much
narrower than the effect of the decision under English law, and
introduces a much stricter requirement as to causation of loss. In
particular, a requirement of individual targeting may restrict the
scope for interstate actions. In the wake of the Provimi judgment, it
appears to be the case that standing under German law and the law of
some of the other major continental European jurisdictions, such as
Italy, to bring antitrust actions is, in effect, narrower than in
29 Max Boegl Bauuntemehmung et al. v. Hanson Germany (Ger. Dst. Ct. 27
June 2003) (unreported).
30 The court in Max Boegl followed the approach of the German Federal Court
in the Familienzeitschrift case, B.G.H. N.J.W. 2819, 2822 (1984), in its narrow
reading of standing, despite the fact that this approach has been widely criticised in
the German legal literature.
31 See Max Boegl, supra note 29 (last paragraph of (e) and last paragraph of
HI).
32 Id. (point (f)).
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jurisdictions, such as England. Discrepancies of this kind are liable to
provoke so-called "forum-shopping" within the EU.
C. Discovery
It is commonly remarked that extensive powers of discovery
exist for parties under U.S. and English, as well as Irish, discovery
procedures, and the absence of such procedures under the procedural
laws of other EU Member States is often cited as a reason for the
apparent lack of private enforcement actions in those other Member
States. Fundamentally, the difference between the common law and
continental civil law jurisdictions in relation to the provision and
submission of evidence to the courts (a more linguistically neutral
term might be "fact-finding") is that the common law lawyer is under
an obligation towards the court to disclose all evidence, both
supportive and harmful to his case. 33 On the other hand, a civil
lawyer is obliged, generally speaking, only to disclose those materials
necessary to prove his case, subject to the power, in certain
circumstances, for the judge to order disclosure of material from. the
parties or third parties. In this case, however, it appears that the order
in question has to be made in respect of pre-identified documents. In
short, the potential claimant in continental jurisdictions needs to have
sufficient evidence to satisfy the burden of proof before launching an
action,34 whereas the common law system offers a much greater
scope for launching actions on the grounds that evidence favorable to
the claim might be turned up during discovery.
35
In proceedings before the French commercial courts, the
courts with principal competence to hear competition actions, the
basic rule is that a party is obliged only to disclose those materials
13 Civ. P. R. 31.6 (standard disclosure in English civil proceedings), available
at http://www.dea.gov.uk/civil/procrules-fin/contents/parts/part31.htm (last visited
Apr. 29, 2004). There are wide discovery obligations under U.S. law that are
backed by heavy sanctions for non-compliance.
4 Article 146(2) of the French Nouveau Code de Procidure Civile (New Code
of Civil Procedure) states explicitly that "requests for documents from the other
party or third parties cannot be made." (translated). This would appear to run
counter to "fishing expeditions" of the type seen in common law proceedings.
35 An important exception to the narrowness of disclosure in the civil law
systems is the power of the court to order an expert report. This could be into an
issue such as the calculation of damages in an antitrust case. The English system
also allows the court to appoint an expert and encourages (post the 1998 Woolf
reforms) the parties to agree on a joint expert.
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necessary to prove his case. 36 This is subject to the power of the juge-
rapporteur, the judge in charge of the case, to order, either on his own
initiative,37 where the power appears to be more limited, or at the
request of one of the parties, M the disclosure of material from the
parties to proceedings or third parties. 39 It appears that the order in
question must be made with regard to pre-identified documents.4 °
Under Belgian civil law, a court will order disclosure of
relevant documentary evidence on the request of the claimant only
where there are serious, specific, and consistent indications that a
party has such evidence. In Italy, as in France, fact-finding is
restrictive, with the judge able to order a party to the proceedings or a
third party, on application by one of the parties or on his own motion
to produce documents. It appears, however, that the judge's
discretion to order disclosure is exercised rarely and most commonly
in the small claims courts. Again, in Italy it appears that the relevant
document must be identified in the order. The situation in the
Netherlands also resembles the French system: the judge can order
both parties to the proceedings and third parties to disclose
documents, but in the absence of such an order, the parties do not
have the right of discovery of documents held by third parties.
Similarly, in Spain the court can order disclosure of relevant
documents held by both parties and third parties. In Germany, the
power of the judge to order disclosure of documents appears to be
more restrictive even than in the French system, with the power of
the court in Germany to order the parties to submit relevant
documents appearing to be realized primarily through orders made on
36 N.C.P.C. art. 132.
3' N.C.P.C. art. 10. Article 144 of the New Code of Civil Procedure also
provides that the judge may order a "mesure d'instruction," which could include a
request for production of a document, whenever "le juge ne dispose pas d'616ments
suffisants pour statuer." N.C.P.C. art. 144.
38 N.C.P.C. arts. 11(2), 138 (third parties); art. 142 (parties).
39 If the disclosure request is addressed to a third party, it must be issued by
the court itself and not the juge-rapporteur.
40 Documents ordered from third parties should be "suffisamment
ddtermin6s." Civ 2e, 15 Mars 1979: Bull civ. II, n 88; RTD civ. 1979. The order
must identify the desired documents. Coin 12 Mars 1979: Bull civ. IV, n 97.
Documents cannot be ordered from a party "sans savoir au prdalable de quels
documents il peut s'agir et s'ils peuvent presenter quelque lien de rattachement
avec un 616ment de prdvue de la cause examinre." TGI Marseille, 20 Fdvrier 1979:
Gaz Pal 1974 2 544; Reims, 6 Octobre 1981: Gaz Pal 1982 1 Somm 181.
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the court's own motion.4' Therefore, even within the continental civil
law jurisdictions, there appears to be variation in procedures relating
to fact-finding, let alone in comparison simply to the common law
system.
It is not to be taken for granted, however, that extensive
discovery available to the parties automatically acts as a spur to
litigation: the slowness of competition proceedings in the English
courts, though this phenomenon is clearly not limited merely to
England, has been attributed in part to the broad discovery
procedures available. Such procedures can slow down litigation by
requiring parties to spend large amounts of time and resources on
producing and disclosing various documents to the other side. In the
Iberian proceedings before the English courts,42 which at the time of
the judgment of Justice Laddie were already seven years old, the
High Court remarked on the extensive discovery proceedings as a
factor contributing to the length of proceedings:
[t]hose proceedings were initiated nine years ago and relate
to trading more than 10 years ago. Even the English
proceedings are now seven years old. I confess that against
that background, I do not find the prospect of a full English
High Court action with discovery, experts' reports and
cross examination at all attractive.
It may be that problems relating to the length of proceedings
will be eased by the abolition of the notification system at the EC
level, which should mean that parties can no longer make tactical
delaying references. Nevertheless, the fact remains that an extensive
power of discovery brings with it concomitant delay and expense.
D. Class Actions
Class actions, as recognized in the United States, are not
common in the legal systems of the Member States of the EU. The
key feature of a U.S. class action is that an individual, including a
lawyer, can bring a claim on behalf of an unidentified group of
plaintiffs. Instead, the principal EU jurisdictions tend to favor, if
41 See Peter Gottwald, Fact Finding: a German Perspective, in THE OPTION OF
LITIGATING IN EUROPE, at 72ff (D. Carey Miller & P. Beaumont eds., United
Kingdom National Committee of Comparative Law (London), 1993).
42 Iberian UK Ltd. v. BPB Indus. PLC et al., [1996] 2 C.M.L.R. 601 (1996).
43 Id.
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anything, representative actions brought, in the field of antitrust
actions, by consumer associations. Provision to this effect exists in
the antitrust laws of the United Kingdom and Germany. In the United
Kingdom, Section 47B of the Competition Act of 1998, as inserted
by Section 19 of the Enterprise Act of 2002, provides that consumer
associations specified by the Secretary of State can bring actions for
damages on behalf of two or more individual consumers before the
Competition Appeal Tribunal, the specialized competition court set
up by the Enterprise Act. Under the same provision, such claims can
only be brought on the back of an infringement decision made by a
public authority, either the Office of Fair Trading or the Commission.
English procedural law also offers, beyond the mechanisms of
joinder of parties to a single action44 and representative actions, 45 the
more specific feature of the Group Litigation Order ("GLO") "to
provide for the case management of claims which give rise to
common or related issues of fact or law." 46 Such claims are entered
as a group on a GLO register, and a judgment given in any claim in
the group is binding on all the other GLO claims entered at the time
of that judgment, subject to a common right of appeal, and may be
binding on claims raising the same issues entered on the GLO
register at a later date. Lawyers for the claimants are encouraged by
the procedure to nominate one lawyer to take a lead in bringing and
managing the action. There would appear to be no reason why this
type of procedure could not be applied to an antitrust action brought
before the English courts, though the recent English EU Competition
Law Practice Direction, which was published in January 2004 to give
effect to certain procedural issues arising from the modernization of
EC competition law, is silent on this specific point.
Similarly, in Germany, Section 33 of the Gesetz Gegen
Wettbewerbsbeschrdnkungen (German Antitrust Code) allows for an
action for an injunction to be brought before the courts by
"associations for the promotion of trade interests provided the
'44 New parties can be added to the action to "resolve all the matters in dispute"
or to resolve a particular issue that affects the additional party. See CODE CIVIL [C.
Civ.] R. 19.2 (1998) (Eng.). Similar provision exists under German antitrust
procedural law. See GERMAN ANTITRUST CODE, § 88.
45 An action may be begun or continued by or against representatives of
persons with whom those representatives share a common interest. See C. Civ. R.
19.6 (Eng.). Any judgment obtained can only be enforced against a person who is
not directly party to the proceedings by means of a court order. Id.
46 C. Civ. R. 19.10 (Eng.). Group Litigation Orders are covered by C. Civ. R.
19.10-19.15 (Eng.).
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association has legal capacity.",47 There is, therefore, no public
registration mechanism for class actions of this type in the German
system. However, damages actions are not included. It is interesting
to note that the U.K. antitrust procedural rules set out in Section 47B
of the Competition Act of 1998 (as above) covers damages actions
and not actions for injunctive relief. Section 33 also applies only to
breaches of German competition law: it does not apply, under the
provisions of section 96 of the Antitrust Code, to actions for breach
of Community competition law. It should be noted, however, that the
proposed "7 GWB Novelle," which is intended to amend German
antitrust law in light of the modernization of EC competition law,
would establish the possibility for actions for damages to be brought
by trade and consumer associations for breach of EC competition
law. This amendment is to be welcomed as helping to realize the
jurisprudence of the ECJ in Crehan.
Italian law does not provide any procedure for a collective
action for the enforcement of competition law. In Italy, a recent law,
legge 281/99, has made provision for standing for consumers and
consumer associations to bring actions for breach of fundamental
rights such as the protection of health, security, product safety, and
fairness of commercial transactions, but it does not appear, as of yet,
that this has enabled either consumers or their representative
associations to find actions for breach of competition law.
There is a similar provision in Portuguese law providing for
the right of natural persons or associations (companies are expressly
excluded) to apply for injunctive relief in relation to infringements of
law on inter alia public health, pollution, qualit% of life, and
consumer protection (the list is not exhaustive). It has been
suggested that the right to bring this type of injunctive action implies
also the right to bring damages actions in relation to the same
violations.5 It has also been suggested that, in contrast to the position
in Italy, violations of antitrust law would trigger these provisions,
47 English translation of the German Antitrust Code as provided by the
German Federal Cartel Office.
48 See G. Tesauro, Private Enforcement of EC Antitrust Rules in Italy: the
Procedural Issues, Italian Procedural Law Report to the 2001 EUI Conference on
Private Enforcement of EC Antitrust Law, in EUROPEAN COMPETITION LAW
ANNUAL 2001: EFFECTIVE PRIVATE ENFORCEMENT OF EC ANTITRUST LAW 267,
276 (Ehlermann and Atanasiu eds., Hart 2003).
49 The acqao popular, based on PORT. CONST. art. 52 and Law No 83/95 of 31
August 1995.
50 Private Antitrust Litigation 2004, at 61 (Global Competition Review, 2004).
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although competition law is not expressly included on the list of
applicable infringements.5
While there would appear to be no provision for a class or
representative action in the civil law system of France, there is a
possibility of an action in the interest of the ordre public to be
brought by the Minist~re Public, though this action is only available
in relation to certain specified restricted practices. 52 Furthermore, in
France certified consumer associations can also bring a claim seeking
to protect consumers' collective interests.53 In Spain, the Consumers
and Users Association can bring a claim on behalf of a determinable
group.54 In the Netherlands, any foundation or association whose
object is to safeguard the interests at stake may bring a claim for the
protection of third-party interests. Monetary damages cannot be
claimed, but such association can request a declaratory judgment on
the basis of which individual claimants can sue for damages. In
Germany, the proposed "7 GWB Novelle" includes a provision that
might help to redistribute the effects of anticompetitive behavior,
though it would seem primarily through public rather than private
means of enforcement. The proposal provides for a novel right of
public action whereby the competition authority can order the
recovery of the economic advantage that accrued as a result of an
antitrust infringement. This 'fund' can be distributed to entities that
suffered damage as a result of the infringement. Companies that have
made such payments to the competition authority may use this as a
defense in private action claims in the same matter.
In Sweden, the recent Act of Class Actions,55 which entered
into force on 1 January 2003, has introduced the possibility of class
actions in a variety of cases. The Act provides for different types of
class actions, including: (1) association class actions, brought by a
non-profit association, that represents consumer or employee interests
in disputes between a consumer and a business enterprise; and (2)
public class actions, brought by an authority suitable to represent the
group and designated by the government. According to the Act, class
actions can only be brought where such an action is the best
procedural alternative. In other words, the majority of claims can
51 Id.
52 C. COM. art. L.442-6 (Fr.).
53 C. CONSUMER art. L.421-1 (Fr.).
A C. Civ. art. 11 (7 January 2000).
55 The Act on Class Actions, 599 (2002) (Swe.).
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only be brought on a class and not on an individual basis. The group
of claimants bringing the action should be of such a size and be
clearly defined so as to enable the court to determine what procedural
steps are necessary to ensure judicial administration of the case. The
size of the group is also an important factor in establishing whether a
class action is the best procedural alternative. Under the Swedish
system, all class settlements require judicial authorization and the
court will not authorize any settlement that discriminates against
certain group members or is otherwise clearly unreasonable. This
system for class actions as established by the Act is clearly a recent
development and it remains to be seen how it will operate in practice.
There already exists a parallel for the representative actions
mechanism at the Community level. A recent proposal in the
environmental field includes a provision that a representative body
recognized by the Member State in which it is situated, and subject to
meeting certain criteria laid down by Community law, shall be able to
bring actions for breach of Community environmental law before the
national courts.56 Moreover, Directive 98/27 on consumer injunctions
establishes the right for "qualified entities," organizations
representing the collective interests of consumers or independent
public bodies responsible for protecting the collective interests of
consumers, in one EU Member State to seek an injunction with
respect to infringements of national law provisions implementin
certain EC consumer protection directives in another Member State.
E. Indirect Purchasers
Under Italian procedural law, Article 2043 of the Codice
Civile (Italian Civil Code) provides that a claimant has standing to
bring a damages action only where he can prove direct injury. This
rule appears to have been relied upon by the Corte di Cassazione
(Italian Supreme Court in the field of private law) to dismiss for lack
of standing a consumer action seeking annulment of a bank loan for
violation of Article 81 of the EC Treaty.58 Swedish tort law provides
56 Commission proposal of 24 October 2003 for a Directive of the European
Parliament and of the Council on access to justice in environmental matters, art. 5,
COM(2003)624.
57 Directive 98/27/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19
May 1998 on Injunctions for the Protection of Consumers' Interests, 1998 O.J. (L
166) 51.
58 Cass., sez. un. 1, 4 mar. 1999, n.1811. The court in this judgment appeared
to see competition policy more in terms of protecting competition and the
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that the claimant must demonstrate loss that is "reasonably caused"
by the infringement in question, such that it appears to be the case
that claims by indirect purchasers are difficult under general Swedish
civil procedural law. The same observation can be made, for
example, in relation to French law, which appears to impose a strict
causation requirement in damages actions for breach of competition
law.59 Thus, the procedural laws of these Member States could be
said to resemble the U.S. indirect purchaser rule, with the result that
actions by both consumers and their representative associations
become significantly more difficult to bring, though the U.S.
experience should show that they are not impossible for that reason
alone. The effect of the German decision in Max Boegl would appear
to have a similarly restrictive effect as to standing for consumers.60 It
has been argued, however, that Community law would favor the
exclusion of the indirect purchaser rule.61 In relation to German and
Swedish law, there appears to be a tension between case law and
principles of tort law that are restrictive as to standing for indirect
purchasers, and specific statutory provisions aimed at encouraging
representative or class actions by consumers or their associations, as
discussed above.
The situation in Italy has been further complicated by a law
adopted on 8 February 2003,62 which provides that the Giudice di
Pace (Judge of Peace) is not competent to issue an "equity decision"
in respect of an allegedly anticompetitive contract executed by a large
constitutional principle of free enterprise, under Article 41 of the Italian
Constitution, than in terms of protecting consumers' interests directly.
59 The strict causation test under French law of "causalit6 adequate," whereby
a causal link is held to exist only between the damage and the determining factor
among all the factors which contributed to the damage, appears to be favored by the
French courts in competition actions. See, e.g., Eco System v. Peugeot, Paris
Tribunal of Commerce, 22 October 1996 (unreported); Socidt6 Labinal v. Socintrs
Mors and Westland Aerospace, Cour d' Appel de Paris, 13 May 1993, Europe, July
1993, comm. no. 300, upheld by the Cour de Cassation on further appeal; and
Sony v. Concurrence, Cour d' Appel Paris Oct. 22, 1997 (unreported).
60 See supra Part III.A.
61 See FIDE Congress 1998 General Report on the Application of Community
Competition Law on Enterprises by National Courts and National Authorities, at 44
(1998) (referring to the case law of the Community court on the protection of
Community law rights by the national courts as noted above), available at
http://ceuropa.eu.int/comm/competition/speeches/text/sp 1998_027_en.pdf (last
visited Apr. 29, 2004).
62 Decree for Urgent Dispositions in relation to Equity Judgments, No. 18
(Feb. 8, 2003) (It.).
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number of consumers. The law was adopted in response to the car
insurance antitrust actions brought in Italy on the back of an
infringement decision in relation to the same behavior by the Autoritt
garante della Concorrenza e del Mercato (Italian Competition
Authority). This law appears, therefore, to make it more difficult for
consumers to bring antitrust actions, given that the Judge of Peace
was held by the Corte di Cassazione (Court of Last Appeal) in earlier
proceedings relating to the same litigation to be the competent court
to hear antitrust actions brought by consumers.
63
F. Damages
There is no explicit reference in the text of Articles 81 or 82
of the EC Treaty themselves as to the possibility of awarding
damages to parties who suffer financial loss as a result of an activity
prohibited by those articles. Nevertheless, after the decision of the
ECJ in Crehan, it is now established that any individual may claim
damages for loss caused to him by a contract or conduct liable to
restrict or distort competition within the meaning of Article 8 1.64
However, case law in the national courts awarding damages for
breach of Articles 81 and 82 goes back before the Crehan judgment,
even if the case law making such awards is relatively rare.
It is important to note that many lawsuits are settled out of
court and details are rarely public, as secrecy is normally a condition
of settlement. Therefore, the small number of known cases may
represent the tip of a much bigger base of actions not brought to final
judgment before a court. Given the extent of the issue and the
difficulty of getting hold of all relevant information, it would be
difficult to make a full inventory of all successful damages actions
brought in the courts of the Member States to date, and what follows
is necessarily of the character of an overview.
1. In Relation to the Difficulty of Proving the Infringement
Within the national systems of the Member States it appears
to be the case that establishing an infringement of Article 81 or 82 of
the EC Treaty is problematic for claimants, though the problems with
bringing successful actions may not be due only to the establishment
of the infringement, but may be connected to other related issues,
such as the establishment of the causal link between the behavior in
63 Cass., sez. un., 9 dec. 2002, n.17475.
64 See supra Part I.B.
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question and the damage suffered.
In the English courts it appears that there has been only one
successful action for breach of Community competition law to date.
This is the Article 82 action brought by Hendry and Williams against
the snooker world governing body,65 though in that case no damages
were awarded. In Italy, there does not appear to have been any
successful damages actions for breach of Community competition
law, and in Germany the only action that could be characterized as a
successful action for breach of Community competition law was in
fact a declaratory action, and no damages were awarded. There
appear to be more successful damages actions in France than in the
other principal European jurisdictions. This fact might be a
counterweight to the wide jurisdictional ambit of the English courts
pursuant to the Provimi judgment, though this, itself, could be
overstated if the courts of the other Member States interpret
Regulation 44/2001 consistently.
Turning to the English cases in some more detail, besides
Hendry & Williams et al. v. World Prof. Billiards and Snooker Assoc.
Ltd., other notable actions relating to Articles 81 and 82 include the
recent judgments in Crehan66 and Arkin v. Borchard Lines Ltd.67 The
Crehan judgment of the English High Court followed on from the
reference to the ECJ on the principle of the availability of damages.
68
However, the claimant failed to recover any damages as the judge
found that there had been no infringement of Article 81 by the brewer
companies. Likewise, in Arkin, an Article 82 case, the claimant failed
to establish a substantive breach of Article 82, though, in this case the
claimant's business strategy and erratic response to the defendant's
behavior constituted a considerable block to the success of the action
(this relates more strictly to causation, as discussed below). A
discernable tendency in the recent case law of the English courts is
reliance on the evidence of witnesses and a reluctance to engage in
complex economic and market analysis.
As to the German courts, a relevant, recent case is British
Telecommunications PLC & Viag Interkom GmbH v. Deutsche
65 Hendry & Williams et al. v. World Prof. Billiards and Snooker Assoc. Ltd.
(S.C.J. Oct. 5, 2001) (unreported).
66 Crehan v. Inntrepreneur Pub Co. and Brewman Group Ltd., [2003]
E.W.H.C. 1510 (Ch. 26 June 2003).
67 Arkin v. Borchard Lines Ltd. et al., [2003] All E.R. (D) 173, [2003]
E.W.H.C. 687 (Comm. 10 Apr. 2003).
68 See supra Part I.B.
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Telekom,69 where the claimants sought a declaratory judgment that
the defendant was liable in damages as a result of the premature
implementation of a joint venture in the telecommunication sector.
The court held that the defendants had acted in breach of Article
81(1) prior to the effective date of the exemption granted to the joint
venture by the Commission and that they could be liable in damages
pursuant to Section 823(2) of the German Civil Code in conjunction
with Article 81(1) and under Section 1 of the German Antitrust Code.
However, no damages were actually awarded. The claimants only
sought a declaratory judgment that they were entitled to damages
and, subsequently, pending appeal of the proceedings to the Federal
Supreme Court, the claimants voluntarily withdrew the action in 1999
following a settlement between the parties.
Before the Italian courts, it appears that there have been no
successful damages actions for breach of Community competition
law to date. Generally, in Italy failure to prove breach again appears
to be one of the main reasons for the failure of Article 82-type
actions. 70 It appears, however, that there have been successful actions
for damages for breach of national antitrust law, which might be
instructive by way of comparison. In Telsystem/SIP-Telecom, the
defendant, an incumbent telecommunications operator in Italy,
delayed the execution of an agreement with the claimant, a new
entrant and competitor of the defendant, for the installation of a direct
numeric circuit the claimant needed to provide its services. The
defendant, who previously had a monopoly for these services, was in
a dominant position in the affected market. Following an
infringement decision by the Italian Competition Authority, the
plaintiff claimed substantial damages as a result of having its access
to the market delayed as a result of the defendant's abuse of its
dominant position. The Court of Appeal of Milan found that SIP-
Telecom had indeed abused its dominant position and was liable for
the resulting damages. In a subsequent decision, damages were
assessed at approximately 1.8 million Euros, including loss of profit.
Damages have also been awarded for breach of Italian national
69 British Telecomm. PLC & Viag Interkom GmbH v. Deutsche Telekom,
[1998] C.M.L.R. 114 (1998).
70 See Tesauro, supra note 48, at 272.
71 Judgments of the Court of Appeal in Milan of 18 June 1995, in Foro it.
1996, 0, p. 276 and of 24 December 1996, in Danno e Responsabilitt, 1997, 5, p.
602.
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competition law in two judgments from 2003.72
There appears to be more successful damages actions in
France than in the other principal European jurisdictions.73 In 1996,
in Eco System/Peugeot, the Paris Commercial Court awarded
damages to Eco System for losses caused by the conduct of Peugeot.
The text of the decision is not publicly available, but it is understood
that the loss was caused by Peugeot's infringement of Article 81 as
established by the Commission in a decision adopted in 1991. 74 The
Paris Commercial Court awarded Eco System damages of
approximately 245,000 Euros to compensate for losses in its
operating results caused by the infringement.75
The most notable French case to date is perhaps that of
Mors/Labinal. This case concerned the supply of tire pressure
indication systems for aircraft. In 1998, the Paris Court of Appeal
awarded damages of approximately 5 million Euros to the claimant
76for breach of both Articles 81 and 82. The same court had
previously decided, in 1993, that there had been an infringement of
those articles.77 The Court of Appeal in its 1993 judgment had
decided on liability and ordered the defendants to pay a provisional
amount of damages while referring final assessment of quantum to a
later hearing.
There are some examples of successful damages actions for
breach of Community competition law from other European
jurisdictions. In a judgment of the Swedish Supreme Court in 2002,
72 Judgment of the Corte d'Appello of Rome of 20 January 2003 in
Albacom/Telecom Italia (damages of approx. 1,300,000 Euros awarded to the
claimant for losses caused by the defendant's abuse of a dominant position) and the
judgment of the Corte d'Appello of Milan of 30 April 2003 in Bluvacanze Spa/I
Viaggi del Ventaglio Spa et al. (damages of approx. 230,000 Euros awarded for
losses caused by a concerted practice).
73 Besides the cases for breach of Community competition law as discussed
below, it is worth noting that, as in Italy, there is a recorded successful action for
breach of national competition law before the French courts. See Judgments of the
Paris Court of Appeals in UGAP/CAMIF of 13 January 1998 and 22 October 2001.
74 Commission Decision No. 92/154/EEC of 4 December 1991, Eco
System/Peugeot, 1992 O.J. (L 66) 1.
75 Eco System v. Peugeot, Paris Tribunal of Commerce, 22 October 1996
(unreported).
76 CA Paris, 30 Sept. 1998, Europe, Dec. 1998, comm. No. 410.
77 CA Paris, 13 May 1993, Europe, July 1993, comm. no 300, upheld by the
Cour de Cassation on further appeal, Cass. Com., 14 Feb. 1995, Bull IV, no. 48,
Europe, Apr. 1995, comm. No. 146.
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SAS was awarded a large sum in damages against the Swedish Civil
Aviation Administration ("Luftartsverket") for a discriminatory
pricing practice relating to Arlanda airport.7 The court held that the
Luftartsverket had abused its dominant position by applying
discriminatory prices against SAS. The Luftartsverket was obliged to
pay SAS approximately SKr600 million and SAS was relieved from
paying approximately SKr400 million to the Luftartsverket.
In the Netherlands, the Amsterdam District Court awarded
damages in the case of Theal BV and Watts/Wilkes.79 The claimant
filed a complaint with the Commission and also sued for damages
before the national courts. Prior to the eventual adoption by the
Commission of a decision finding that the defendants' practice of
precluding parallel imports was in breach of Article 81,80 the District
Court of Amsterdam independently decided that the defendants were
in breach of Article 81 and awarded damages to the claimant. The
Court of Appeal upheld the judgment.
By contrast, in the Dutch case, Oosterhuis/Eurofair,gl the
claimant had been refused a place in an international household fair
and filed again a complaint with the Commission and sued for
damages in a parallel action. The Commission advised Eurofair to
change its regulation, and once this was done, gave notice that the
regulations were no longer in breach of Article 82. The District Court
of Amsterdam decided that the grounds on which Eurofair refused
Oosterhuis entry to the fair were in compliance with the amended
regulations and, therefore, had not been in breach of Article 82.
Accordingly, the court dismissed the claim for damages.
2. In Relation to the Burden & Standard of Proof
It appears to be the case that meeting the standard of proof in
Article 82 cases, in particular, has been a deterrent to private
enforcement. Presumably, this is because it can be difficult for
claimants to amass sufficient evidence to meet the standard of proof
required to prove in particular dominance for the purposes of Article
82. To help address this problem, section 20(5) of the German
Antitrust Code actually puts the burden of proof on the defendant to
78 Luftartsverket v. SAS, Case No. T33-00 (Swe. S. Ct. 2002).
79 Judgment of the Amsterdam Dst. Ct. of 11 January 1979 (unreported).
80 Commission Decision No. 77/129/EEC of 21 December 1976, Theal/Watts,
O.J. (L 39) 19.
81 Judgment of the Amsterdam Dst. Ct. of 29 October 1980 (unreported).
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disprove the abuse in cases of abuse of dominance brought by
SMEs-the burden of proof shifts to the defendant if there appears to
be a violation "on the basis of specific facts and in the light of general
experience." The defendant is required to clarify those aspects of its
business activities "which cannot be clarified by the competitor.. .but
which can be easily clarified, and may reasonably be expected to be
clarified" by the defendant. 82 This provision applies strictly only to
national law. The French system provides for a different mechanism
aimed at addressing problems of burden or standard of proof: the
Minister of Finance can intervene to submit observations with a view
to helping the claimant establish a breach. This appears capable of
application in antitrust proceedings, but, to date, does not appear to
have been used in this way.
Furthermore, there may be differences between national
European jurisdictions as to the required standard of proof in Article
81 and 82 cases. For example, there is English authority for a "high
degree of probability" test, while there is Irish authority, based on
Masterfoods Ltd. v. HB Ice Cream Ltd. ,84 for the "balance of
probabilities" test, the normal standard of proof in civil proceedings.
The usual balance of probabilities test also appears to have been
applied by the English High Court on a preliminary issues hearing in
Arkin.85 Confusion of this type could impede coherent private
enforcement. In relation to burden of proof, Article 2 of Regulation
1/2003 provides that the burden of proving an infringement of Article
81(1) or of Article 82 rests on the party alleging the infringement, 86
while the burden of proving that the conditions of Article 81(3) have
been met rests with the party seeking to rely on that provision-the
defendant.
82 English translation of the German Antitrust Code as provided by the
German Federal Cartel Office.
83 Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc. v. Maclaine Watson Co. Ltd., [1989] 3
C.M.L.R. 429 (S.C.J. 1989) (the court appeared to have reached this conclusion on
the grounds that there is the possibility of a fine in competition proceedings).
84 Masterfoods Ltd. v. HB Ice Cream Ltd., [1992] 3 C.M.L.R. 830 (Ire. H. Ct.
1992).
85 Arkin v. Borchard Lines Ltd., [2001] Eu.L.R. 232 (Q.B.).
86 This has been confirmed recently in the context of a Commission
investigation by the ECJ in its plenary judgments in Cases C-2/01P & C-3/01P,
Bundesverband der Arzneimittel-Importeure and Commission v. Bayer, para. 62 (6
January 2004) (unreported).
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3. In Relation to Causation
It appears from the case law and the literature that causation
also appears to be problematic in proving loss in private antitrust
actions in Europe. It has been commented that it can be difficult to
attribute loss specifically to the defendant's behavior rather than to
other factors, such as a general economic slowdown or even the
claimant's own business strategy. In Hendry, it appears to have
been difficult for one of the claimants to argue successfully for the
existence of damage caused by loss of a business opportunity.
88
Attributing loss to the claimant's behavior breaks the causal link, as
the court in Arkin found (obiter), though in Arkin, it does appear to
have been the case that the claimant was to an extent the victim of his
own business strategy. In Provimi, the English court held that a
sufficient causal link exists between the behavior of the defendant
and the claimant's loss even in circumstances where the claimant
made no actual purchase from the defendant.
89
4. In Relation to the Calculation of Damages
Quantification of damages in competition cases is not, by its
nature, a straightforward issue, and the U.S. experience shows how
the possibility of complex econometric methods of damage
quantification can complicate private actions. In European case law,
it does not seem that the courts of any jurisdiction have developed a
coherent approach to the subject, let alone a standardized approach
across the different jurisdictions. Not surprisingly, national courts
appear to address this issue by turning to the methods of calculating
damages available in normal civil proceedings. In some jurisdictions
these methods appear capable of generating delays that are
aggravated by the complex nature of such calculations in competition
cases. Moreover, the differences represent a significant barrier to a
level playing field in the procedural conditions for bringing actions
for breach of Community competition law before the national courts.
The English courts appear to favor a straightforward approach
to the quantification of damages rather than favor any sophisticated
econometric analysis, such as might be expected to be made by
87 See, e.g., Tesauro, supra note 48, at 276. Tesauro makes this comment in
relation to Italian law, but goes on to say that problems of this kind apply in most
Member States. Id. at 278.
88 Hendry, at para. 157.
89 See supra Part III.B.
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regulatory authorities. In this way, the English courts can be seen as
essentially applying the usual rules of civil procedure to competition
cases rather than seeking to develop any significant expertise or
differentiated procedure for the purposes of quantification of
damages in such cases. In Arkin, for example, the English court was
provided with detailed expert, econometric evidence as to the
position the claimant would have been in but for the anti-competitive
conduct of the defendants. However, the judgment of the court places
no weight on this material and is skeptical as to its worth. The judge
preferred what he called a "common sense approach." A similar
approach was taken in Crehan, where the judge appeared to have
been influenced by the evidence provided by the claimant's
accountant witness, whose evidence was not of a specialist economic
or econometric nature. There was no sign of any detailed analysis by
the court of the figures before it, but instead the court appeared
willing to rely on the figures provided by the witnesses. The
claimants in Hendry, although successful in establishing an
infringement, were unable to recover any damages partly because
they did not provide any evidence of loss.
It should be remembered that those parts of both Arkin and
Crehan dealing with quantification of damages are strictly obiter
since there was not a substantive finding of infringement in either
case. The court in both cases dealt with quantum of damages perhaps
in order to pre-empt any attack on this issue in the case of an appeal.
It seems that a major challenge for any party relying on economic
evidence will be to render such evidence intelligible, credible, and
relevant to the judge.
The court in the German case of Max Boegl
Bauunternehmung et al. v. Hanson Germany indicated that evidence
provided by the claimants on the measure of damage, which the
claimants appear to have calculated by referring to a hypothetical
market price, was not sufficient and, thus, imposed a high evidentiary
standard for the calculation of damages. However, the proposal of the
German Federal Government, "7 GWB Novelle," provides that the
party that has suffered damage can opt to claim the illegal profits that
arose from the antitrust infringement instead of a detailed calculation
of damages.
As to the Italian cases, the case reports for Telsystem/SIP-
Telecom do not shed any light on how the damages were quantified.
The court stated the principle that the loss of opportunity to enter the
market amounted to harm that should be compensated but left the
calculation of damages to technical experts. The issue of the criteria
used to settle the amount of damages is apparently still to be clarified
2004]
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in Italy, and the area of quantification of damages as a whole appears
problematic under Italian law. The French courts take a similar
approach, leaving the quantification of damages to be clarified at a
later stage, once liability is established. This happened in
Mors/Labinal, where quantification was referred by the Court of
Appeal to a later hearing of that court, although the defendants were
ordered to pay a provisional amount of damages in the interim. It
would appear that such a system can result in some delay for the
parties. In Mors/Labinal, the final order for damages followed five
years after the original finding of liability, though this delay was
perhaps aggravated by the appeal to the Cour de Cassation made by
the defendant after the finding of liability by the Court of Appeal and
before its quantification of damages. 90 In Italy, this system did not
appear to produce such long delays in Telsystem/SIP-Telecom, with
the decision as to quantification of damages following on 24
December 1996 from the decision as to liability made on 18 June
1995.
G. Passing On
There appears to have been very little consideration of this
potentially important issue in the European jurisdictions to date.
There does not appear to be any case law directly on point from any
jurisdiction in relation to actions for breach of EC competition law.
The issue, however, has been considered by the Italian courts in
relation to national antitrust law, which may serve as a useful point of
comparison. In Indaba Incentive Company/Juventus,9 1 the Torino
Court of Appeal held that the agreements in question were, as a
90 It is worth noting that the same procedure of precise calculation of
quantification of damages at a later hearing has also been used in relation to
proceedings for breach of national competition law in France. In UGAP/CAMIF,
referred to above, the Paris Court of Appeal ruled as to liability in January 1998
and, at that hearing, designated an expert to hear the amount of the loss suffered
and postponed a ruling on the amount of damages to a later hearing. Damages were
finally quantified by the same court on October 22, 2001, by which it awarded
damages to CAMIF amounting approximately to 1.5 million Euros, plus interest
accrued since the date of the finding as to liability. The court also added
capitalization of interest. In Eco System/Peugeot, relating to infringement of
Community competition law, the Paris Commercial Court's damages award was
made in 1996, five years after the decision of the Commission finding breach in
relation to the same behaviour. It is not clear why there is this delay and to what
extent, if at all, it is attributable to procedural delay in the court system.
91 Judgment of the Corte d'Appello di Torino, in Danno e ResponsabilitA, p.
46 (6 July 2000).
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matter of substance, in violation of national competition law, but
appeared to have refused to award damages on the grounds that the
claimant, which provided ticket distribution services to the defendant,
had passed on the effects of the defendant's anticompetitive behavior
to the final consumers. Thus, it would appear to be the case under
Italian law that upstream producers are protected against litigation
brought by both intermediaries who have passed on the
anticompetitive effects, such as in Juventes, and by the indirect
purchasers to whom those effects may have been passed on. It should
be noted that the current German proposal, the "7 GWB Novelle,"
provides for the exclusion of the passing on defense.
H. Settlements
Settlements are more rarely reported than court decisions,
since parties that agree to pay damages out of court typically will
insist, as a condition of the settlement, that the matter be kept
confidential. It is difficult to establish exactly how many settlements
are reached in relation to competition actions. It might also be worth
considering the impact that settlements have on the conduct of private
litigation as a whole and, conversely, the ways in which the
conditions for bringing private actions impacts the nature and rate of
settlements reached. But, such topics are perhaps beyond the scope of
this paper and by their nature difficult to quantify.
Two major cases are known to have been closed in Sweden
by way of settlement. These involve, as defendants, two former
public monopolies, the former Swedish State Railway, and the
Swedish Post. Both of these settlements were reported in the Swedish
press when the cases were still pending in the Stockholm City
Court.92 Although the settlements are not public documents, it
appears that the claimants had sued the former monopolies for
damages caused by abuses of their respective dominant positions.
The German case of British Telecommunications PLC v. Viag
Interkom GmbH/Deutsche Telekom, as discussed above, also settled
before damages were awarded, though the type of relief sought
before the District Court in these proceedings was not monetary.
92 Cases T 8-1093, BK Tag AB/Statens Jarnvagar AB, and T 8-738-96,
Cotu,ao: Swedem AB/Posten Sverige AB.
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IV. The European Commission & Private Enforcement
The Commission is currently looking at the conditions under
which private parties can bring actions before the national courts of
the Member States for breach of the Community competition rules.
93
As noted above, it is commonly stated that in the United States
private action accounts for around 90% of competition enforcement,
whereas in Europe there have been very few successful actions in this
field.
The objective of the exercise is to facilitate the enforcement
of the Community rules on competition by means of private actions
before the courts of the Member States. Under Regulation 1/2003,
which applies from 1 May 2004, Article 81 of the EC Treaty will be
directly effective in its entirety. Work undertaken in relation to
private enforcement of Community competition law should,
therefore, be seen in the context of making the reforms brought about
by Regulation 1/2003 effective in practice, and as an important
further step in the promotion and enforcement of the competition
rules throughout the Community. Underpinning the initiative is,
therefore, the desire of the Commission to encourage competitiveness
in the European industry, as declared to be a central objective of
Community policy at the Lisbon European Council, and to protect the
interests of the European industry and consumers alike.
Practice and procedure in countries like the United States is
clearly an example of some interest to the Commission. The
Commission will be seeking to establish, inter alia, why private
competition actions are common in such countries and infrequent by
comparison to date in the Community.
A great deal of research is required to establish what the
potential obstacles to private enforcement of the competition rules in
the Community are and how the U.S. experience might be of use in
relation to the enforcement of the competition rules in Europe. At the
end of 2003, the Commission commissioned a study to assist it with
this work, the final results of which should be available to it by June
2004. Based on the results of the study and its own research, the
Commission will, in the second half of 2004, commence work on the
drafting of a Green Paper with a view toward identifying potential
ways for the facilitation of private enforcement of Community
93 A previous study; known as the Braakman Report, in this area was carried
out for the Commission and published in July 1997. See Braakman (ed.), The
Application of Articles 85 and 86 of the EC Treaty by National Courts in the
Member States (European Commission, July 1997).
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competition law. The Green Paper will be used to consult
stakeholders, a prerequisite to the launching of any proposal in this
area.
V. Conclusion
Although the new enforcement system established by
Regulation 1/2003 strengthens the possibilities for private parties to
seek and obtain relief before the national courts, a number of
potential obstacles to private enforcement remain. The time is now
right to clearly identify the relevant obstacles and start looking at
ways to facilitate private enforcement before national courts. It will
be necessary to tread carefully, drawing, where appropriate, upon the
experience of other jurisdictions, and in particular, the U.S.
experience.

